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ABSTRACT
Each year parents transfer a great deal of money to their adult children. While intuition might
suggest that these transfers are altruistic and made out of concern for the well-being of the children,
the fundamental prediction of the altruistic model has been decisively rejected in empirical tests.
Specifically, the required derivative restriction-that an increase of one dollar in the income of the
recipient, accompanied by a decrease of one dollar in the income of the donor, leads to a one dollar
reduction in transfers-fails to hold. I show in this paper that in fact, this prediction will not hold if
parents use observations on the current incomes of children to update their expectations about future
incomes. This result implies that many past studies have relied on too restrictive a test, and
furthermore, that our ability to distinguish empirically between altruistic and exchange behavior is
severely limited. The paper also analyzes the variation in transfer behavior over time and finds
substantial change across periods in recipiency status as well as strong correlation between inter vivos
transfers and the transitory income of the recipient. This evidence suggest that dynamic models can
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Intergenerational transfers between family members are an important economic phenomenon, par-
ticularly those transfers from parents to children. Gale and Scholz (1994) estimate yearly flows
between parents and their non-coresident children of S50 billion in 1999 dollars. Because of the
magnitude of the funds involved such transfers are likely to have a substantial impact on other
economic behaviors. Certainly they will affect the well-being of both donors and recipients and
will have consequences for the distribution of wealth. In addition, however, familial transfers may
interact with public transfers, and in doing so could alter the effectiveness of government assistance
programs.
The importance of the effects in any of these dimensions depends crucially on the motivation
behind the private transfers. While the relationship between motive and impact has been long
recognized, only recently have data of sufficient quality to test alternative hypotheses become
available. Unfortunately, despite several efforts, a consensus has not yet been reached on the most
appropriate model of behavior as none of the hypothesized models appears to be consistent with
observed patterns giving.
The two most prominant models of familial behavior, altruism and exchange, makevery dif-
ferent predictions about the redistributional aspects of private transfers, and about the interaction
between public and private assistance, so distinguishing between the two is of both theoretical and
practical interest. In the literature, attention has centered on testing the predictions of the altruism
model. This model, wherein parents care about the welfare of their children, makes strong predic-
tions about the signs and relative magnitudes of the effects of the donors' and recipients' incomes on
transfer amounts, so testing is apparently straightforward. However, while the standard altruism
model is written in a static context with the effects of interest being changes in lifetime transfers
in response to changes in permanent incomes, the actual data used to test the model come from
a dynamic world: Researchers observe current rather than permanent income, and single period
rather than lifetime transfers. As I show in this paper this difference in measurement is likely to
lead to incorrect conclusions in tests of the model's validity.
Recent work testing the predictions of the altruism model in a dynamic context (Altonji,
llayashi, and Kotlikoff, 1997) has concluded that the model is inconsistent with observed data.
1Specifically, a fundamental prediction of the altruism modeV—that conditional on transfers being
made, an increase of one dollar in the income of the recipient, accompanied by a decrease of one
dollar in the income of the donor, will lead to a one dollar reduction in transfers—was decisively
rejected. (I will term this relationship the "derivative restriction."1) However, under reasonable
assumptions about the formation of expectations of future income, the derivative restriction will
not hold. Thus, caution should be used when drawing conclusions from studies that have used the
restriction as a test of altruism. Furthermore, because this derivative restriction has been the sole
means of differentiating between altruism and exchange regimes, my result suggests that our ability
to distinguish between the two explanations of behavior may be severely limited.2
The model developed here assumes that the future income of a child is not known, rather
the parent knows only its distribution. Observations on the child's current income in each period
provide new information that is used to update the distribution of future income. Changes in this
distribution affect expected future transfers, and in a dynamic programming model feed back to
affect current transfers. Through this mechanism, the responsiveness of current transfers to changes
in current income is reduced, causing the derivative restriction to fail.
Intuitively, consider an example wherein the arrival of a new observation on the child's income
causes the parent to reduce her estimate of the child's future income and consumption. Not only
will the parent wish to increase transfers in the current period, but she will also expect to increase
future transfers as well. In this case the derivative of interest—the change in current transfers for
a change in current income—differs from its value in the absence of updating, and the derivative
restriction predicted by the static altruism model no longer holds.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), the paper provides an empirical
test of this dynamic framework. Specifically, I examine the relationship between current transfers
and both current and lagged income of the potential recipient and find that both variables have
significant explanatory power. I interpret these results as evidence that a parent's assessment of
her child's future income depends on past realizations of income. This result is consistent with
'Altonji et al. use the term "transfer income derivatives restriction."
2An alternative test of the two models relies on the sign of the effect of the recipient's income on the amount
of the transfer. An altruism model predicts a negative relationship while either a positive or negative relationship
is consistent with exchange. An estimated positive effect can therefore be used to discount the altruism modeL
However, recent empirical work has consistently found a negative relationship, and thus this test has provided no
distinguishing power.
2the updating model introduced below. As a specification test I test the effect of future income on
current transfers and find that it does not have significant explanatory power.
In exploring the implications of this dynamic framework, I also examine variability of transfers
over time. In the two years for which I have data I find a significant number of changes in recipiency.
In each year approximately 13 percent of children are reported to be receiving transfers, yet only 5.5
percent of the sample receives transfers in both survey years. These dynamic aspects of behavior
have frequently been ignored because of data limitations,3 yet from the empirical work presented
here they appear to be an important phenomenon.
The availability of repeated observations on each child allows me to examine transfer behavior
net of permanent differences across individuals. If there exist unobserved characteristics of the
parent or child that are correlated with transfer behavior and with the included measures of income,
then estimated derivatives from equations that ignore these effects will be biased. In a fixed effects
framework I find that the effect of current income on transfer behavior is large and significantly
different from zero, but is approximately 60 percent smaller than its effect in specifications that do
not control for unobservable differences across children. These results indicate a strong negative
correlation between transfers and the transitory income of potential recipients and also demonstrate
the necessity of adequate controls for permanent income in dynamic models of transfer behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 1 outline the standard altruism
model and discuss the tests used to distinguish this model from an exchange regime. I then expand
the static model to include two periods and note the conditions under which the predicted results
differ. Section 3 describes the data I use in the empirical work and section 4 discusses the estimated
effects of current income on transfers. A final section concludes and summarizes the results.
2 Background and Theory
I divide the theoretical discussion into two subsections. The first presents the standard altruism
model and the second extends this model to two periods.
3flunn (1997), and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) are exceptions. These papers both use multiple waves of
the NLS surveys. However, information is not available on all siblings of the (potential) recipients, so a complete
understanding of the allocation within families is not possible.
32.1 The static altruism model
In the standard altruism model parents care about the well-being of their children; they receive
utility from their own consumption and from the utility of their children. Following the standard
specification used in Cox (1987), the utility function of a parent is written as =U(c,V(ck))
where c, and ck are the consumption of the parent and child, respectively. The consumption of
the child is determined by his own income ZJk and transfers from the parent T. Thus, 0k =Uk+ T.
Because this is a one-period model there is no saving.
The comparative statics of the altruism model yield two testable predictions. First, the change
in transfers for a change in a child's income is negative (-<0); as the child's income increases,
the marginal utility of an additional dollar of consumption decreases, and the parent transfers less.
This result implies that in families with more than one child, parents will make greater transfers to
lower income children, in effect compensating the lower income children for their lack of resources.
The second testable implication of the altruism model is that if transfers are positive, an increase
of one dollar in the child's income along with a decrease of one dollar in the parent's income, will
result in a decrease of one dollar in transfers to the child. That is, --— = —1where w is the 8Yk ô
income of the parent. To see why the relationship holds, consider the following intuitive example.
In a one-period model a parent has an income of $200 and her child has an income of $50. Given
this initial allocation the parent chooses to transfer $50 to her child so that the consumption of the
parent is $150 and the consumption of the child is $100. Now suppose the parent's income were
$199 and child's income, $51. If the parent continues to transfer $50 to her child, the distribution
of resources would be ($149, 8101). If this allocation were preferred to a ($150, $100) division then
the parent would have initially chosen to transfer $51. Thus, by a revealed preference argument the
parent prefers ($150, $100) to ($149, $101) and will reduce her transfer by one dollar in response
to the change in incomes.
Given these straightforward predictions, empirical tests of the model have centered on the
estimates ofand -.Earlywork by Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) found a positive
relationship between a child's income and the amount of a transfer, a contradiction of the negative
relationship predicted by the altruism model. However, these early studies were not able to control
adequately for the income of the parent. Because well-off children tend to have well-off parents,
4and well-off parents make greater transfers, the estimates obtained forwere positively biased.
More recent efforts that better control for the incomes of both the parent and child have found
a strong negative relationship between the child's income and the amount of the transfer (Cox
and Jappelli 1990, Dunn 1997, MeGarry and Schoeni, 1995, 1997), a result consistent with the
altruism model, but also with alternative models.4 Although the sign offound by these studies
is consistent with the altruism model, the magnitudes ofand -(whereestimated) fail to
satisfy the derivative restriction, with estimates of — thatare closer to 0 than to -1.
2.2 Static versus dynamic outcomes
The model outlined above is placed in a static framework. In the context of a single period model,
parents know the lifetime earnings of their children, and the lifetime consumption of children is
calculated directly as the sum of earnings and transfers. Parents make greater transfers to children
with lower lifetime incomes and the timing of earnings and transfers is not an issue. However,
in a more representative multiperiod framework, with an uncertain future, the timing of transfers
becomes an important matter.
As noted by Altonji et al. (1997), absent additional constraints, if the child's permanent income
is uncertain, a parent will de'ay transfers in order to obtain additional information and more
efficiently allocate resources. Furthermore, parents who are uncertain of their own date of death
or future needs will be reluctant to part with resources they themselves might need some day and
prefer to postpone transfers (Davies, 1981). Acting against the postponement of transfers is the
fact that children are unlikely to be able to borrow against future transfers and thereforemay not
be able to smooth consumption optimally across time. Even children with high lifetime incomes
may be the recipients of transfers if they are temporarily liquidity constrained and unable to attain
the level of consumption predicted by their permanent incomes (Cox, 1990). Thus one would expect
a negative relationship between transfers and current income, and a positive relationship between
transfers and indicators of liquidity constraints. However, whereas the derivative restriction holds
4The most frequently cited alternative to the altruism model is an exchange model wherein observed transfers
represent payment for services provided by the child. Tn the exchange model parents care about their own utility
and the services (a) provided by the child. Formally, U,, =U(c,,a). In contrast to the predictions of an altruism
model, in an exchange regime the sign of the relationship between a child's income and the magnitude of a transfer
is indeterminate. As a child's income increases, the price of his time increases and the quantity of time purchased
therefore decreases. The net amount spent by the parent to purchase services (price x quantity) can either increase
or decrease depending on the elasticities of supply and demand for services.
5with respect to changes in permanent income in a static model, it is not clear that the same
relationship must exist with respect to current income in this dynamic framework, even if children
are liquidity constrained.
To illustrate the problem formally consider a simplified version of the two period model from
Altonji et al. (1997). Parents receive utility from their own consumption in each period c and c,,2
and from the utility of their children, V(ck1), and V(ck2) where ckt denotes the child's consumption
level in period t. Ignoring interest rates and the time rate of discount, let the utility function of
the parent be
U =U(c1)+ ?)V(ck1) + U(c) + V(ck2)
where U and V are concave functions and the child's utility is weighted by ij. Following the previous
literature, I assume that the parent has income tu, in period 1 and no second period income. She
saves A1 in period 1 to finance period 2 consumption and transfers. The child has income Yk in
each period t, where t =1,2.Here I focus on the case in which children are liquidity constrained in
period 1 and cannot borrow across periods:6 their consumption in each period is therefore the sum





In the first period the parent does not know her child's period 2 income, but does know its distri-
bution, conditional on information I available in period 1, f(y,2 II).Theparent will maximize her
utility using the expected value of second-period utility,
In the first period the parent observes yk1 and w, and chooses T1 andc. In period 2 the parent
then observes yk2 and divides remaining resources A1 between '2 and c.
5This discussion, and the notation used here draws directly on Altonji et al. (1997).
6As demonstrated by Altonji et al. (1997) if a child is not liquidity constrained the parent has no incentive to
make transfers in the first period. The more interesting case is therefore the one in which the child does face these
liquidity.
6The solution to this dynamic programming model can be obtained by first solving for the optimal
allocation in period 2 as a function of A1 and yk2 That is, the parent maximizes the function
U2(Ai—T2) +t)V2(yk2 +7'2)
with respect to T2, yielding an optimal value for TI2 (and thus c,2)asa function of A1 and Yk2,
T=T2(Al,yk2)
= A1—T2.





One should note that in the above maximization problem the variablesivy,,yk1, andT1, ap-
parently always enter in pairs as either w, —T1or yk1 + TI1. Altonji et al. note this result and
conclude from it that the derivative restriction --—=—1 continues to hold provided that
Bilk1O
Idoes not change.7 However, in a plausible multiperiod framework one would expect f(yk2 I)to
be a function of Ilk1, but not of Ilk1 + TI1. If the distribution of second period income does depend
on the observation of first period income then the derivative restriction is broken. In their theo-
retical discussion, Altonji et al. note that "the determinants of expected future income" need be
held constant when considering the partial derivative of transfers with respect to current income.
Their empirical analysis attempts to hold constant these determinants by including measures of
permanent income carefully constructed from repeated observations on income and other covari-
ates. However, it is likely that changes in current income also change expected future income (and
7To understand how this conclusion is reached, consider the firstorderconditions of the above utility maximization
problem. These equations will be functions of w,— T1and Ilk1+l'i.Writing one such equation as H(w —T ,y1+2'),
and differentiating first with respect to w and then with respect to Yki yields a system of two equations such that
H1(1 —-) +H2E— = 0 and H1(—T—) + 112(1 + = 0, where H is the derivative of the function C with
respect to the jtt' argument. These two equations can be combined and the terms rearranged to yield the result that
OT
QUip —
7thus expectations of permanent income). If this is the case, then an analysis of the effect of changes
in current income on transfer behavior needs first to understand the relationship between changes
in current and future incomes, and then to take into account this additional effect. The accuracy
of our estimated effects and the correctness of the conclusions we draw from them will depend on
our ability to do this.
To understand this mechanism in the context of the above model, consider the specific case
where yk1 and Yk2 have a bivariate normal distribution with means [LI and P2, variances ?and
a, and a correlation coefficient p. The conditional distribution of yk2 given yk1 has an expected
value equal to p2+(—i'i)andvariance (1 —p2)a.Thus, if p is positive, a low value of Yki
1/k1 < [ii) will reduce the child's period 1 consumption and increase the marginal utility of a
transfer T1. At the same time, a low value of 1/k1 will shift the distribution of1/k2 to the left. This
shift will decrease expected second period consumption of the child, increase the marginal utility
of a transfer in that period, and thus increase the marginal utility of A1. To equalize marginal
utilities across arguments of the utility function, the parent will reduce c and increase both T1
and A1. Because of the change in A1, the increase in T1 will be less than if the distribution of1/k2
were unaffected.
The proof of this result for the general case is in the appendix. There I show that under
reasonable assumptions about the relationship between income in the two periods, the value of
— liesbetween zero and negative one, consistent with the results of previous empirical
studies. In the specific case of the bivariate normal distribution I show that the distance between
— and-1 depends directly on the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. If p =0,so that
period 1 income is uninformative about period 2 income, the derivative restriction holds.
In the empirical work that follows I use repeated observations on the income of a child to test
the validity of this dynamic framework.
3Data
Thedata used in this study are from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The HRS is a panel
survey of the U.S. population born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses. When appropriately
weighted the sample is representative of the U.S. population of the target cohort. The initial wave
of questioning was conducted in 1992 with 12,652 respondents interviewed in 7703 families. The
8second wave followed in 1994. The follow-up rate in wave 2 was 92 percent with 11,492 respondents
re-interviewed in wave 2 and 132 respondents dropped from the survey for administrative reasons.
I use data on the 6626 families for whom I have information in both surveys.8
These data are uniquely suited to a study of transfer behavior for several reasons. First,
individuals in this age group are particular likely to be making inter vivos transfers (Schoeni,
1993). Second, the survey has specific questions about transfers to children which likely result
in more complete reporting of such transfers than the more general questions about assistance
to individuals outside the household used in most surveys. Finally, there is relatively detailed
information on each child in the family allowing for a complete within-family analysis, and two
observations per child allowing for an examination of changes in transfers over time.
The families in my sample have a total of 21,170 children. The income of children plays a central
role in my study; however, income is not reported for coresident children, so I exclude these children
from the analysis. In addition, in order to avoid including legally required support payments, I
further restrict my sample to children aged 18 and over in the first wave of the survey. With these
selection criteria I have a sample of 5381 families with 16,177 children.
The means for several of the variables used in the subsequent analyses are presented in table 1.
The family income of children is measured categorically in the HRS with the categories being income
of less than $10,000, S10,000-$25,000 and greater than 825,000. As is apparent from comparing
the distribution across categories in wave 1 and wave 2, there was a significant increase in the mean
income of children. Fourteen percent of children had family income of less than $10,000 in wave
1 compared with just 8 perceut in wave 2. This result is to be expected given the average age of
the children and the typical age-earnings profile. It is also consistent with the slight increase in the
proportion of children who are married, from 0.63 to 0.65 percent, and the accompanying income
of a spouse. Along with the increase in income, the proportion owning a home increases from 0.47
to 0.52.
8The wave 2 data I use is from an early release. Transfer information for 166 families (2.4 percent) remains
incomplete at this time. These are predominantly families that have had some significant event between waves that
makes coding of the family data difficult (e.g. the death of a child, a remarriage of the parents with the complication
of added step-children). This omission is not worrisome as the responsiveness of parental transfers to changes in the
child's income is perhaps best understood by excluding those with significant changes in other respects that may
distract from the income effect.
91n wave 2 the "greater than $25,000" category was further divided into greater or less than $40,000. I combine
these two upper-most categories for consistency with the first wave.
9The probability that.a child receives a transfer increases substantially between waves from 0.15
to 0.19. This change is largely an artifact of the survey design. In the first wave of the survey,
respondents were asked if they made a transfer of $500 or more to a child in the past year, and
if so, the amount transferred. In the second wave, the cut-off for reporting transfers was lowered
to $100 and the fraction of children who reportedly received a transfer increased. Consistent with
the inclusion of smaller transfer amounts, the mean amount of the transfer (over positive values)
decreases from $2962 to $2098. If I impose the wave 1 criterion on the wave 2 data, and treat all
transfers below $500 as a zero transfer, the proportion receiving transfers in wave 2 falls to 0.13 and
the average amount increases to $3024.10 For the remainder of the paper I will use this selected
sample of wave 2 transfers. The results of the multivariate analyses are unchanged when transfers
of less than $500 are included.
The cross-sectional transfer patterns in wave 1 are described in detail in McGarry and Schoeni
(1995) and are not repeated here. Instead I emphasize a comparison between the two waves. As
shown in table 2 there is considerable variation in the receipt of transfers from wave to wave.
Fifty-nine percent of children who received a transfer in wave 1 did not in wave 2 (7.7/13.2), and
55 percent of those who received a transfer in wave 2 had not received one in wave 1 (6.6/12.1).
Just over 5 percent of the children in my sample received a transfer in both waves. For those who
received a transfer in both waves the correlation between the two amounts is 0.19 (not shown).
Even within families there is a significant amount of re-ordering of transfer amounts. If children
are ranked by the size of the transfer they receive in wave 1 and again in wave 2, the correlation
between the rankings is positive, but is just 0.29.
Table 3 shows the number of children with decreased, constant, or increased income between
waves, along with the direction of change of the transfer amount. Those who did not receive
a transfer in either wave are excluded from the table.11 For children whose income decreased
between waves (and who had a non-zero transfer in at least one wave), the majority (58 percent)
had an increase in transfers while 39 percent had a decline in transfer amounts. The relationship is
'°Despite the fact that the survey question in wave 1 asked respondents to report only transfers of $500 or more,
a few respondents reported transfers of amount less than $500. When I restrict the wave 2 transfers to those of $500
or more, I impose the same restriction on the wave 1 data. Thus, the mean amount for wave 1 increases slightly as
a result of the restriction,
"If individuals who never received a transfer were included, and treated as receiving identical transfers (of zero)
in each wave, the middle column of the table becomes (616, 5552, 2044).
10even stronger for those children with an increase in income; 61 percent had a decrease in transfer
amounts and 35 percent had an increase. Because the income categories are rather broad there is
likely to be a good deal of movement within category that is not captured as a change in income
in the data. Given the age of the children in the sample and the typical age-earnings profile, one
would expect the movement within category to be positive, on average, as is the movement across
categories (table 1). Tn accord with this hypothesis, for those with no change in income there was
a somewhat greater probability of a decrease in transfers than of a increase, 55 versus 42 percent.
The numbers presented in this section indicate a substantial amount of period to period variation
in recipiency, and suggest that transitory shocks to income and/or temporary liquidity constraints
likely play important roles in explaining observed behavior. This evidence demonstrates the im-
portance of studying transfers in a dynamic context. In the following section I focus directly on
the relationship between the current income of children and their receipt of transfers.
4 Empirical Analysis of Income Derivatives
This section presents estimated regression equations for the probability and amount of a transfer.
The goal of this exercise is to obtain an unbiased estimate of the responsiveness of transfers to
changes in current income. Most past studies have not controlled for unobserved heterogeneity
in transfer behavior, and have therefore likely obtained biased estimates of the effect of income.
An estimate of the derivative of transfers with respect to income is important for estimating the
potential degree of crowding out of private assistance by public programs. The larger the change
in familial transfers for a change in the income of the potential recipient, the less effective will be
government assistance programs targeting these same individuals.
In what follows I first discuss the importance of correctly specifying the error process and then
present estimates of the effect of changes in the child's current income on transfers, under varying
assumptions about the error terms in the equations. I do not directly test the derivative restriction
in part because the use of categorical measures for the child's income in the HRS precludes an
accurate test, but mainly because the theoretical analysis above and the subsequent evidence of
income updating, nullifies the use of the derivative restriction as a test of altruism.
114.1 Specification of the empirical transfer equation
Omitted variables: An important consideration in the empirical analysis of transfer behavior is the
correct specification of the error process. One would expect there to be differences across families
in affection and other unobservables that would be correlated with transfer behavior. Even within
families it is likely to be the case that there are unobserved differences across children, perhaps in
ability or in the effort they apply to their jobs, that will be correlated with the parent's decision.
If these factors are ignored, estimates of the included effects will be biased.
To illustrate the potential problem more formally, consider the following Stone-Geary specifi-
cation of the utility function for the parent.12
=(1—rj)log(c —/31)+ijlog(c —/32).
In this specification j3 and /32 represent minimally acceptable consumption bundles for the parent
and child. They are assumed to be functions of the characteristics of the specific individual and to
contain any unobserved heterogeneity, where the heterogeneity may family-specific and/or child-
specific. Assuming linearity, flu and /32 can be written as
fl= biXi+ej
/32 =b2X2+e2.
This specification of the utility function implies a transfer equation of the form
T =i —(1
—)vk—ijbjX1+ (1 —r7)b2X2+ e
where
C= tiei+ (1 —7/)e2.
This expression is linear in e1 and e2—error components that may be correlated with the child's
income. For example, on the family level, parents will differ in the level of consumption they desire
for their children and will therefore have invested differentially in the schooling of children. These
differences in schooling will in turn lead to differences in the income of the children. In this case the
unobserved family specific component will be postively correlated with both current transfers and
12For simplicity in this example I temporarily ignore the dynamic aspect of transfer behavior.
12with the child's income. On the child level, 2mayinclude a measure of the child's industriousness.
If parents are satisfied with a lower level of consumption for less industrious children (i.e. $2is
lower for these children) then ceteris paribus transfers and industriousness will be positively cone-
lated. We would also expect the child's income to be positively correlated with his industriousness,
leading again to biased effects of the derivative. Proper estimation of the transfer equation thus
needs to control for these sources of potential correlation.
Permanent income: While transfers in a dynamic model are, in part, a function of permanent
income, in empirical applications there is likely to be substantial measurement error in y,,. This
measurement error provides additional cause for concern about the quality of the estimated coef-
ficients in a regression analysis. Most studies of transfer behavior do not have information on the
permanent income of the children and use schooling level as a proxy variable (Cox 1987, Cox and
Rank 1992). If the omitted components of permanent income, such as ability, are correlated with
current income, and with transfers, the estimated effects of current income are likely to be biased.
Even for those studies wherein authors are able to construct measures of permanent income (Cox
1990, Altonji et al. 1992b, 1997, Dunn 1997), the measures are likely to contain a good deal of
error. It is difficult to imagine that the econometrician has sufficient information to predict perma-
nent income with the same level of accuracy achieved by parents contemplating transfers to their
children. Studies that ignore these potential correlations and errors in variables likely estimate
biased effects of the included variables. Below I use a fixed effect analysis to control for permanent
differences across children.
4.2 Multivariate analyses
In this section I estimate equations for the probability a child receives a transfer and for the amount
of the transfer. I first estimate the pair of equations in a simple cross-section specification. These
specifications offer a description of transfer behavior in the cross section and provide a base against
which to compare later models that control for unobserved heterogeneity. I then control for the
possibility that parental decisions on transfers may differ across families in unobserved ways that
are correlated with the regressors. Similar results have been reported elsewhere (McGarry and
Schoeni, 1995) so I do not discuss them in detail. Extending this line of estimation, I take ad-
13vantage of the multiple observations per child to control for unobserved differences across children,
such as permanent income or ability, that are potentially correlated with the explanatory variables.
Controlling for family fixed effects in the cross-section requires multiple observations per family,
while child fixed effects require two observations per child. In order to keep the sample approxi-
mately constant across specifications, before proceeding I delete all children in one-child families
and all children who are observed in only one wave (a total of 1062)13
4.2.1Cross-section results
Table 4 reports the estimates for OLS specifications for the probability a child receives a transfer14
and for the amount, as well as for family fixed-effect and child fixed-effect versions of these models.
Observations for the two waves are stacked for the first two pairs of equations, but the results
are substantially unchanged if I estimate equations separately for each wave.15 The specifications
control for the child's age, sex, schooling level, whether he is still in school, works full-time, is
married, has children of his own, and lives within 10 miles of his parents, and characteristics of the
parent(s): age, race, income, wealth, schooling, and health status. Parental characteristics that are
constant over time are not identified in the family or child fixed-effect specifications in columns 3
through 6.
The estimates in the first two columns indicate that both the probability of receiving a transfer
and the amount are strongly negatively related to the child's current income. Children in the lowest
income category have a 8.6 percentage point greater probability of receiving a transfer than those in
the highest category relative to a mean sample probability of 12 percent. The expected amount of
a transfer for those in the lowest income category is $284 greater than for those in the highest with
a mean amount of transfers being $319. Although the difference in amounts between the lowest
and highest income brackets is significantly different from zero at a one percent level, it is small
in economic terms. The change in the child's family income from the lowest (less than $10,000) to
the highest (greater than $25,000) income category represents a change of at least $15,000. This
'3The results in the first set of regressions are unchanged if these children are included in the estimation.
14 report estimates from a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but logit and fixed effect (conditional)
logit specifications yield identical conclusions.
'5An F-test on the equation for the amount of the transfer fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are
equal across years. A dummy variable indicating a wave 2 observation is included in the regressions but is significantly
different from zero at a 5 percent level only in column 1. Standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are corrected for repeated
observations per individual.
14difference implies a decrease of less than 2 cents in transfers for each dollar increase in the child's
income.
4.2.2 Family fixed effects
The second pair of columns reports the estimates for the family fixed-effects specifications. The
unobserved family component captures differences in what families consider a minimum level Of
consumption16
Perhaps surprisingly, most of the coefficients for the family fixed effects model are similar to the
first set of estimates. The probability that a child in the lowest income category receives a transfer
is 9.1 percentage points higher than a children in highest bracket, similar to the 8.6 percentage
point difference in column 1. Similarly, moving from the lowest to the highest category decreases
the expected value of a transfer by $229 compared to $284 in column 2. The coefficient for the
middle income category also changes only slightly, from $150 to $129.
What does change significantly between specifications is the coefficient on highest grade com-
pleted. In the initial specification, schooling level and transfers were positively correlated with each
additional year being associated with a $41 increase in transfers. The mean transfer (including
zeros) is $319 so a change of $41 per year of schooling implies that a college graduate receives an
amount in excess of 50 percent of the mean transfer beyond what a high school graduate would
receive. When unobserved characteristics of the family are controlled for, the coefficient estimate
falls to $14 and is not significantly different from zero at a 5 percent level. Apparently there are
differences across families in transfer behavior that are correlated with schooling and not captured
by the parental income, wealth and schooling variables included in the specification.17 For instance,
parents who envision a higher than average consumption level for their children invest heavily in
their schooling and continue to give generous transfers. In terms of a human capital investment
model one could imagine that parents who face a lower cost of capital can borrow at a sufficiently
low rate that they invest more heavily in their children's schooling than might other parents, and
also can afford to respond more readily to liquidity constraints encountered by the child and make
'6Alternatively, the unobserved component could be thought of as a measure of dynastic income (Altonji, et aT.
1 992a). In contrast to differences in expected levels of consumption, dynastic income will change over time, If I allow
the unobserved family component to vary across waves to take account of this possibility, the results are substantially
unchanged.
'7The reported results are from specifications with parental income and wealth entered in quartiles. The effects
are unchanged if parental income and wealth are entered as continuous variables with linear and quadratic terms.
15more transfers throughout the child's life.
4.2.3 Child-specific effects
An altruistic model predicts that parents will choose the amount to transfer over a lifetime with
regard to a child's permanent income. However, if a child is unable to borrow freely across periods
parents may make transfers to alleviate liquidity constraints as well. Holding current income
constant, the degree to which a child is liquidity constrained depends, in part, on his permanent
income. Thus transfers will be made with regard to both permanent and current incomes. The
empirical specifications above do not contain a measure of permanent income of the child beyond
the inclusion of completed schooling. To control for this and other permanent characteristics of
the child, I estimate a fixed-effects model. Because I also control for schooling in the regression the
individual specific error might best be thought of as permanent income less the effect of schooling
(and other observables). If one considers permanent income to be primarily a function of schooling
and ability, this unobserved error component can be termed a measure of ability.18
The estimated coefficients from this specification are shown in the right-most pair of columns
in table 4. When child specific effects are controlled for there continues to be a significant negative
relationship between a child's income and both the probability of transfer receipt and the amount,
however the effect is dampened substantially from earlier estimates. Children in the lowest income
category are 4 percentage points more likely to receive a transfer than children in the highest
category, and the expected value of the transfer is only $145 greater, approximately 50-60 percent
of the effects in the preceding columns.'9 Again assuming a $15,000 change in incomeacross
15Again, because I have multiple observations per family as well as two observations per child, it is possible to
estimate a "difference-in-difference" specification rather than a simple fixed-effect version, and thereby aflow the
family fixed effect to change over time. Thus if the transfer equations for child i in family jattime 1 and time 2 are
=x1r' +o+ +
= x2r+ 9i + 6j2+
where uijt is white noise, then both the child specific effect, O, and the time varying family specific effect, Sj, can
be differenced-out by examining the relationship
(T2 —T2)
— — T1)((X2 —X2)
— — Xi))F+ 6i
where Cjjj is white noise,is the mean value of all children in family jattime t and similarly for Xj. The
estimated coefficients for the child's income in this specification are nearly identical to those with a simple child-
specific effect, although the standard errors are increased accordingly. In footnote 19 I note the estimated effects
from this difference-in-difference specification.
'°The estimated coefficients for the two income categories from a difference-in-difference specification (see footnote
19) are 0.045, and 0.024 for the probability equation and 145 and 50.4 for the amount.
16categories an increase of Si in income is associated with less than a one cent decrease in transfers.
if one assumes that current income and unobserved ability are positively correlated, the substan-
tial change in the estimated income coefficient suggests that there is a strong negative correlation
between transfers and unmeasured ability. This result is consistent with a model wherein parents
invest in the schooling of more able children and provide cash transfers to those with less ability
(Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman, 1982).
The set of results in table 4 also demonstrates that estimates of the effect of current income
that ignore unobserved child-specific effects may be severely biased and point to the possibility of
substantially overstating the potential for crowding out if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored.
4.3 The relationship to lagged income
In the two-period model described above, the observed value of a child's period 1 income alters the
expected distribution of his period 2 income, and therefore affects expected second period transfers.
If the model is extended to more than two periods, period 1 income will also affect expectations
about income and transfers in period 3 and beyond. Because transfers made to a child in a given
period, say period 2, depend on both his current (period 2) income and his expected future (period
3) income, period 1 income will continue to affect period 2 transfers even after period 2 income is
observed. More generally, under these assumptions, transfers in any period will depend on both
current and lagged values of income. The regressions in table 5 test this prediction.
In the first column of table 5 1 estimate the probability that a child receives a transfer in
wave 2 as a function of both current (wave 2) and lagged (wave 1) income. Both measures are
significant predictors of transfers at a 1 percent level, and are negatively correlated with the transfer
probability. iTowever, the effect of current income is somewhat greater than the effect of lagged
income. This difference is consistent with a more direct relationship between current income and
liquidity constraints than between lagged income and such constraints. Increasing current income
from the lowest bracket to the highest bracket results in a 8.3 percentage point decrease in the
probability of a transfer. The comparable effect for lagged income is 7 percentage points.
The second column examines the determinants of the amount of the wave 2 transfer. Being
in the lowest income category in the current period increases transfers by $142, while low lagged
income increases transfers by $104. Both effects are significantly different from zero, although the
17latter effect is significant at just a 10 percent level.
An alternative explanation for the significant effects of lagged income is measurement error.
Because of the use of income categories in the survey, the income of a child is necessarily measured
imprecisely. An observation on lagged income may help identify where within the category a child's
current income lies. If income rises smoothly over time, a child who has income below $10,000 in
period 1 and between $10,000 and $25,000 in period 2 will likely have a lower actual period 2
income than a child whose income was between $10,000 and $25,000 in each period. In this case
one would expect lagged income to be negatively related to transfers. Because future income has
the same potential to help identify actual income as does lagged income, the two variables should
have similar explanatory power in transfer equations. Thus as a further test of the updating model,
I re-estimate the first two equations in table 5, but with wave 1 transfers as the dependent variable,
and current (wave 1) and future (wave 2) incomes as regressors. If the effects of period 1 income
in the first two columns of table 5 are due to measurement error, then future income will have an
effect on current transfers that is similar to that of lagged income. However, if lagged income affects
current transfers through an updating mechanism, then the effect of future income on transfers will
not be significantly different from zero since it has not been observed and therefore could not be
incorporated into expectations.
In the equation for the probability of a transfer, future income is a significant predictor, but
its effect is much smaller than the effect of lagged income shown in column 1. Being in the lowest
income category for future income increase the probability by just 3.9 percentage points, compared
to the 7.0 percentage point effect of lagged income in column 1.
With respect to the amount of the transfer, wave 2 income does not have a significant effect;
the standard errors are as large as the point estimates. This result is in contrast to the large and
significant predictive power of wave 1 income on wave 2 transfers. This difference is consistent
with the proposed model but not with a model wherein measurement error is responsible for the
significance of lagged transfers.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper considers the standard test of the altruism model of transfer behavior in a dynamic
context. Previous studies have consistently rejected altruism as an appropriate model based on the
18failure of the test of the derivative restriction. I show here that if parents use the current income
of their children to update their expectations about future incomes, then the derivative restriction
ought not to hold. In fact, for reasonable distributional assumptions, the value of —r willlie
between zero and negative one. This result has important consequences for our ability to distinguish
between altruistic and exchange-motivated behavior.
In addition to this theoretical contribution, the paper provides a description of the dynamic
aspects of transfer behavior. Using panel data I find that the amount of change in both the
probability of receiving a transfer, and in the amount received, over a two year period, is large.
This result suggests that a substantial fraction of transfers are made in response to short-term
income fluctuations, consistent with the liquidity constraint argument of Cox (1990).
I examine this relationship further by estimating the effect of current income on transfers,
net of permanent characteristics of the child. Using multiple observations per child, I control
for fixed child-specific characteristics in a regression context. I find that the estimated effect of
the child's current income on transfers is biased upward, in absolute value, by approximately 50
percent when permanent differences, other than schooling, are ignored. However, even when fixed
characteristics are completely controlled for, there continues to be a significant negative relationship
between current income and transfers. Taken together these multivariate results indicate that
both permanent and current income play an important role in the determination of transfers and
offer support for the view that transfers are made both in response to permanent differences in
consumption and in response to liquidity constraints. This result is consistent with earlier work by
Altonji et al. (1992b) and Dunn (1997) both of whom control directly for the permanent income
of the child in transfer equations, and both of whom find similar effects for the two measures of
income, but with the effect of permanent income consistently smaller.
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21Appendix
The model in section 2.2 yields the first period maximization problem,
max Ui(i)+Vl(cki)+f[U2(Al —T2(Ai,yk2)+V2(yk2+T2(Al,yk2))f(yk2II)dyk2
with respect to e and Ti subject to the following constraints
A1 =
= Yk1+TI.
Differentiating with respect to c and T1 results in the first order conditions for an interior solution:
=0
=0
where primes denote derivatives and the arguments of the functions are omitted for clarity but are
uniquely determined by the subscripted functions. Let
Then differentiating the first order conditions yields a system of equations
U d —f[g" (dw — — dTi)f(yk2 II)
—'f. (y2 II)dyk1]dyk2 =0
V'dyk, +Vi" dTi —f
[g"(dw —— dTi)f(yI)+g'f1(yk2II)dyk1]dyk2 =0
where fYk (yk2 II)isthe derivative of the probability density function of Yk2 with respect to
Let C1 =f9"f(Yk211)dyk2













uç is negative, A is positive. Thus if G2 <0 then (UçG2)/A >0and —1 < —1 <o• The
difference from -1 depends on the value of C2.
What might one expect for C2? Note first that g' is a marginal utility and is therefore expected
to be monotonically decreasing in Yk2. It can then be shown that if the effect of an increase in the
child's period 1 income is to shift the distribution of yk2tothe right (in other words, the random
variable yk2becomesstochastically larger as yk1increases)20then C2 will negative.21
Consider a concrete example wherein Uk1andVk2 are jointly normal with means MiandM2,
variancesa? and a and covariance p a1a2. In this case,







where E[.] denotes the expected value of [].Theexpectation term in the above expression is the
covariance of the marginal utility of period one savings and the child's second period income which
is negative; an increase in the child's second period income increases the family's second period
resources and lowers the marginal utility of a dollar carried over to that period. Thus, if p is
positive, so that a greater value of 71k1 implies a greater expected value of Ilk2, then C2 is negative.
And the relationship
8T15T1 —— > —1.
Yk1 Owp




is stochastically larger than Vk2 if F,,. (x) <Fyk,(x) V x (Bickel and Doksum, 1977).
21The derivation also requires that Yk2 be bounded to lie between 0 and some maximum income W.
23Table 1
Means of Selected Variables for Sample of Children
n=16,177
Wave 1 Wave 2
_______________________________MeanStd Err Mean Std Err
Total Family Income:
less than $10,000 0.14 0.0020.08 0.002
$10,000-25,000 0.30 0.0040.21 0.003
greater than 25,000 0.41 0.0040.46 0,004
Demographic Variables:
Age 3Q•9 0.0432.9 0.04
Male 0.50 0.0040.50 0.004
Owns home 0.47 0.0040.52 0.004
Lives within 10 miles of parent 0.40 0.0040.38 0.004
Married 0.63 0.0040.65 0.004
Number of children 1.23 0.0101.39 0.010
Highest grade completed 13.04 0.01713.15 0.018
Attending school 0.07 0.0020.05 0.002
Transfers:
Received a transfer 0.15 0.0030.19 0.003
Amount of (non-zero) transfers 2962 1222098 89
Received a transfer$500 0.14 0.0030.13 0.003
Amount of transfer ￿ $500 3055 1263024 129 *Numberof observations differs for some variables due to missing values.
Sample is children 18 and over who do not live with their parents and for
whom information is available in each wave.Table 2
Numbert and (Percent) Receiving Ilansfers in Each Year
Year 2 status
Year 1 status received transfer no transfertotal
received transfer 882 1237 2119
(5.5) (7.7) (13.2)
no transfer 1065 12930 13995
(6.6) (80.2) (86.8)
total 1947 14167 16114
(12.1) (87.9) (100.0)
Sample size differs from table 1 due to missing observations
on transfer receipt.Table 3
Relationship between Change in Income and Change inTransfers
Change in Transfer Amount
Change in Income decreased no change increased totalt
decreased
number 77 8 115 200
percent 38.5 4 57.5 100
same
number 745 45 578 1368
percent 54.5 3.3 42.3 100
increased
number 336 20 195 551
percent 61 3.6 35.4 100
Rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Sample is children receiving a transfer in at least one wave.Table 4




















































































Number of Observations 26,91226,57326,91226,57326,912 26,573
Additional child characteristics included in the regressionsbut not shown are: age, sex,
lives within 10 miles of parent, works full-time, a dummy for income missing. Parental
characteristics included but not shown are income and wealth (in quartiles), health
marital status, race, age, schooling, and an indicator for wave 2. These parental variables
are not identified in the family fixed effect analysis.11
Table 5
OLS Estimates of the Probability and Amount of a Dansfer
With lagged and future income and family fixed effects
Wave 2 transfers with
Lagged Income
Wave 1 transfers with
Future Income
Prob Amount Prob Amount
Current Income:








25,000 or more (omitted)
Lagged Income:








25,000 or more (omitted)
Future Income:










Number of Observations 13,858 13,623 13,987 13,868
Additional variables included in the regressions but not shown are: schooling, lives
within 10 miles of parent, works full-time, ownsa home, currently in school, married,
number of children, and a dummy for missing income.